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Willkommen im Globalen Dorf / 69 Vom Zeitalter der Imperien zum Zeitalter der Gemeinschaften / English Version |
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˧ Dear listeners, this is Franz Nahrada from Bad Radkersburg, welcoming you to the 69th edition of Welcome to the Global Village, first aired in July 2026 on Radio Helsinki Graz. ˧ After two very hands-on broadcasts about our current projects – Mitmachräume and MuraCalling – today I want to return to a more fundamental, theoretical level. As you will see, this theoretical level is deeply connected to the practical intentions behind our projects. ˧
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Christoph Pfluger begins his recent essay in Zeitpunkt with the sentence: “It is a high ambition to want to understand the present.” ˧ Reality seems to slip through our fingers even as we try to grasp it. Everything is being rebuilt while it is still under construction; plans change constantly; events from small states to global powers pile up; explanations contradict each other; shared understanding shrinks; and the search for culprits becomes ever more popular. ˧ We see egomaniacs, despots, ideologues, and puppets at the levers of power – East, West, and at home. We wonder: Are they ignorant? Misled? Bought? Blackmailed? Or is the problem larger than the individuals we point at? ˧ Most people simply want to live – a roof, food, a future for their children, safety, peace. And yet the world rushes toward confrontation with almost suicidal energy: rearmament, wars that can expand, economic conflict where everyone may lose, societies drifting apart, political systems losing control. ˧ A dangerous gap opens between the speed of our systems and our ability to make reasonable collective decisions. Democracy needs time; good decisions need patience, information, contradiction, and dialogue. But the present moves at breakneck speed: financial markets react in seconds, digital outrage waves in minutes, military escalations in hours. ˧ And the larger our political structures become, the longer the pathways of influence – and the more decisions escape democratic control. ˧
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A familiar narrative says: The United States is declining, therefore China must rise. The West loses dominance, therefore a multipolar world emerges. One empire falls, another rises. ˧ But what if this narrative is wrong? ˧ What if we are not witnessing a transition from one hegemon to another – but the end of hegemony itself? ˧ China’s industrial rise, technological acceleration, and global investments seem to mirror earlier hegemonic transitions. The U.S. appears overextended, indebted, polarized, deindustrialized. ˧ But Tomasz Konicz argues: This time is different. ˧ China is not inheriting a healthy world system waiting for a new engine. It is part of a world system whose engine is already sputtering. ˧ After 2008, China compensated for collapsing export markets through massive credit-financed investment – cities, railways, factories, above all real estate. Growth continued, but increasingly on debt. ˧ Unlike the U.S. after WWII, China lacks a long phase of real industrial expansion ahead. Its “New Silk Road” loans meet a world already drowning in debt. ˧ And beneath all this lies a deeper contradiction: the crisis of value production itself. ˧
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Robert Kurz argued that capitalism contains a structural contradiction: ˧ It seeks to expand value through human labor – yet competition forces every enterprise to eliminate labor through automation. ˧ For decades, new industries compensated for lost jobs. Fordism created millions of new workplaces even as it rationalized production. But with microelectronics – and now AI and robotics – rationalization penetrates all sectors. New industries are automated from birth. ˧ The mass of value-producing labor shrinks. ˧ Capital flees into finance: stocks, real estate, derivatives, speculative assets. Claims on future wealth grow faster than real production. ˧ Globalization and the deeper crisis of value intertwine: production spreads worldwide, but the underlying engine weakens. ˧ The immediate answer was not collapse – it was credit. Future wealth pulled into the present. A global deficit economy emerged. ˧ This created a unique symbiosis: China produced, America consumed. China financed U.S. consumption through U.S. debt. ˧ A gigantic loop – but one with an expiration date. ˧
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A second limit emerges: ecological boundaries. ˧ Past hegemonic cycles expanded material throughput – more energy, more resources, more transport, more consumption. ˧ But how can billions more people reach Western consumption levels while climate systems destabilize, soils erode, oceans collapse, water becomes scarce, and resource conflicts intensify? ˧ Konicz argues: China may fail not because it is weak, but because the world in which a new hegemon could stabilize the system no longer exists. ˧ We may not be in an interregnum between empires. We may be in a world where the conditions for empires themselves dissolve. ˧
We speak of many crises – economic, ecological, democratic, geopolitical, social. ˧ But what if these are not separate? What if they are interconnected expressions of one polydynamic crisis? ˧ Konicz describes a crisis that migrates across decades: breaking first at the periphery, then moving toward the centers. ˧ Each crisis is treated separately – but they reinforce each other. ˧ Climate change → droughts → crop failures → rising food prices → social conflict → political instability → migration → new conflicts. ˧ War → destroyed infrastructure → broken supply chains → rising energy and food prices → new debt → shrinking political space. ˧ Resource scarcity → geopolitical conflict → rearmament → fewer resources for ecological transition → deeper ecological crisis. ˧ The crises feed each other. The net becomes unstable. ˧ In such a world, hegemonic stability becomes impossible. ˧
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Konicz’s diagnosis is powerful – but diagnosis alone is not a future. ˧ If crises are interconnected, our responses must also be interconnected. ˧ We must ask: ˧ How does agency emerge from below when large systems lose their ability to guarantee security, supply, and cohesion? ˧
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For decades, we relied on two systems: market and state. ˧ But there is a third: community. ˧ People can organize, finance, use, and maintain things together. ˧ Modern communities are cooperative, open, and practical: ˧
“What does it cost to run a farm for a year in a way that sustains people, soil, and quality?” ˧ The community shares cost and risk. Producers and consumers become co-responsible. ˧ Why only agriculture? ˧ Why not energy, housing, mobility, care, repair, education, culture? ˧ This is Community Supported Everything (CSX) – community-supported economy. ˧ Local agency combined with global learning. Not autarky, but resilience. Not isolation, but connected self-organization. ˧
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Perhaps we truly witness the end of an epoch. ˧ But the end of the Age of Empires need not mean chaos. ˧ It may be the beginning of a different kind of order – one that grows from below, from many interconnected places. ˧ This may be our historical task: ˧ From the Age of Empires to the Age of Communities. ˧ And perhaps the Global Villages are one small part of that answer. ˧
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